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PATH DEPENDENCE IN CORPORATE
CONTRACTING: INCREASING RETURNS, HERD
BEHAVIOR AND COGNITIVE BIASES
MARCEL KAHAN*
MICHAEL KLAUSNER'"
INTRODUCTION
The starting point for the modem analysis of the firm is the metaphor of
a firm as a "nexus of contracts."' From this perspective, the rights and
obligations of various stakeholders in a corporate enterprise-shareholders,
creditors, employees, and managers-are determined by a set of "corporate
contracts." Some of these "contracts" are explicit, such as credit agree-
ments, bond indentures, employment contracts, and charter provisions.
Others are implicit, such as the rules of corporate law and creditor
protection law, which consist largely of default rules that can be overridden
by contract. In the absence of information imperfections, corporate
contracts are expected to maximize the joint wealth of the contracting
parties. Consequently, unless externalities are present, they are expected to
be socially optimal.
Despite the great conceptual significance of contracting in the "nexus of
contracts" metaphor, commentators have paid little attention to the design
and production of corporate contracts. Beyond the abstract presumption that
contract terms are wealth-maximizing (based on an abstract belief that
markets for corporate contract terms work efficiently), the issues of what
factors determine the content of explicit contracts and, perhaps most
interestingly, the degree to which parties opt out of default rules have been
left largely unexplored.
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** Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School.
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1. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976) (introducing the term
"nexus of contracting relationships").
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In other articles, we have attempted to begin filling this void in the
literature.2 We have suggested that corporate contract terms can frequently
offer "increasing returns" as more firms employ the same contract term.
Value arises from the common use of a contract term.3 While an individu-
ally customized term offers obvious attractions, a commonly used term
offers competing attractions that arise solely as a result of its common use.
Moreover, as the use of a term increases, it becomes significantly more
attractive (at least up to a critical point), and its attraction becomes self-
perpetuating. Consequently, increasing returns can lead to standardization
in contract terms over time. Standardization, meaning simply the common
use of a term, is thus a form of path dependence in corporate contracts.4
The value of standardization in contract terms is evidenced by the
prevalence of "boilerplate" provisions found in corporate documents. Bond
indentures, for example, contain many standard provisions formulated in
fairly standard language. In addition, the extent to which firms incorporate
in Delaware, thereby selecting Delaware law to govern the rights and
obligations of managers and shareholders,5 and the frequency with which
firms choose to have New York law govern their bond indentures may be
additional evidence of the value of standardization. In this respect, New
York and Delaware law serve as standard "contract" terms.
Of course, other explanations for the prevalence of standardization exist.
One convenient answer is that standard terms became standard because they
were inherently optimal for most parties when they were originally adopted,
and that they continue to be used by most parties because they remain
inherently optimal. By inherently optimal, we mean that the actual,
substantive content of a term maximizes firm value without regard to the
fact that the same term has been used or will be used by other parties. This
is the answer that economics-oriented corporate law orthodoxy would
provide.
2. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757 (1995); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Corporate Contracting: Standardization,
Innovation and the Role of Contracting Agents (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors
1996).
3. For an analysis of increasing returns in product markets, see W. Brian Arthur, Competing
Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989).
4. Much of this article applies to contracts generally. Because this symposium is on corporate
governance, however, and because our other work in this area addresses corporate contracts more
specifically, we focus this discussion on corporate contracts.
5. This includes mandatory Delaware law plus, to the extent that a corporation does not opt out,
Delaware default rules. For a discussion of the Delaware charter as a standard contract term, see
Klausner, supra note 2, at 841-51.
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While there is certainly some truth to this explanation-in that most
standard terms seem to work reasonably well-we do not believe that this
answer tells the whole story. If one looks more closely at actual standard
terms, as we have in other articles, one finds disturbing instances of
apparent suboptimality: standard terms that do not work in a reasonable
manner; and uniformity in terms where one would expect more diversity
to be optimal.6
A primary conclusion that emerges from our work in this area is that one
must look closely at particular contract terms and at their origins before
reaching any conclusions about why a standard term exists. With respect
to the study of comparative corporate governance, the topic of this
symposium, this means that differences among countries' governance
systems may be related in part to the "increasing returns" that firms in each
country obtain through standardization. At this point, we state this as a
hypothesis deserving empirical study.
The presence of increasing returns, however, is not the only explanation
for standardization. In this paper, we briefly explore two other potential
explanations. First, staying within the confines of conventional economic
analysis, we explain how agency problems between the principal to a
contract and the lawyer who drafts it may lead to standardization. Second,
moving somewhat outside the confines of conventional economic analysis,
we suggest that certain behavioral biases that have been shown to exist in
other contexts may lead to standardization. We make no claim regarding
the extent to which these factors or increasing returns influence standardiza-
tion. Rather, our aim is merely to suggest that they may be important and
therefore warrant future empirical investigation.
Part I of this paper reviews our prior analysis of increasing returns in
corporate contract terms. Within the rubric of increasing returns, we discuss
learning and network externalities in corporate contracts. Parts II and III
examine how agency costs and behavioral biases can lead to standardiza-
tion.
6. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2, at 58-60 (concluding that standard terms of event risk
covenants are suboptimal); Marcel Kahan, Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 2 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 139 (1995) (arguing that standard anti-dilution provisions fail to provide adequate
protection); William A. Klein et al., The Call Provision of Corporate Bonds: A Standard Form in Need
of Change, 18 J. CORP. L. 653 (1993) (concluding that bond call provisions are not optimally designed);
cf Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1737 (1994)
(exploring why that start-ups uniformly adopt tax-disadvantaged forms).
1996]
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I. INCREASING RETURNS: LEARNING, IMFORMATIONAL CASCADES, AND
NETWORK EXTERNALITIES IN CORPORATE CONTRACTS
The attractiveness of a standard contract term arises at least in part from
the fact that it can offer increasing returns to users as more firms adopt it.
These increasing returns can be divided into two related, but conceptually
distinct, types of benefits: (i) "learning benefits," which arise because a
firm adopts a contract term that has been commonly used in the past; and
(ii) "network benefits," which arise because a firm adopts a term that will
be commonly used in the future.7
A firm adopting a charter or indenture has the choice of drafting new
terms or adopting terms that other firms have used in the past. By
developing a new term, the firm can achieve a degree of customization that
may not be available with terms that others have used before. On the other
hand, the use of a term that has been commonly used in the past can offer
alternative attractions. The benefits of such terms include avoidance of
formulation errors, ease in drafting, availability of judicial rulings on the
validity and interpretation of the term, and familiarity among the investors
and securities analysts who, implicitly or explicitly, will put a price on the
term.
Consider, for example, a firm with an unusual set of interlocking
relationships among partially owned affiliates. The well known case of
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien' comes to mind. This firm could customize a
charter provision, allocating corporate opportunities and perhaps specifying
internal procedures for resolving close cases. Alternatively, it could leave
its charter silent with respect to the question, as in Sinclair, and, by default,
adopt the generic corporate opportunity rule provided by state law. Because
many firms operate under the default rule, the default rule is, in effect, a
standard contract term. On the one hand, the customized charter term could
be superior to the default rule because it can be closely tailored to the
firm's precise situation. On the other hand, customization would entail
relatively high drafting costs, a risk of formulation error, and uncertainty
regarding the validity of the term.' In addition, to the extent that the
allocation of corporate opportunities influences the value of the firm's
securities, the market may not price the customized term accurately. In
7. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2.
8. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
9. Legal uncertainty surrounds the question of how much a firm may customize fiduciary duties.
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contrast, by using the default rule, the firm minimizes drafting costs, the
risk of formulation error, and uncertainty regarding validity.' ° Further-
more, it gains the benefit of judicial precedents that illustrate the applica-
tion of the rule in a variety of circumstances that may be instructive later.
Finally, the term will be familiar to securities investors."
Learning benefits constitute positive externalities that earlier users of a
contract term confer upon later users. We refer to them as "learning
externalities." Up to a point, the more experience there has been with a
term, the more valuable the term is. Depending on the particular term
involved, the magnitude and rate at which learning externalities accrue
presumably vary. For some terms, learning externalities may be trivial, and
for others, they may be substantial.
A related set of advantages is available to a firm that adopts a contract
term that will be commonly used in the future-that is, a term that the
adopting firm and other firms will ultimately have in their charters or
indentures contemporaneously, over a significant period of time. At the
time a particular firm adopts the term, other firms may have already
adopted the term, or firms may be expected to adopt it in the future, or
both. We refer to these benefits as "network benefits" to reflect an
analogous phenomenon in the context of "network products," such as
VCRs, telephone systems, and computers. 2
Network products become more valuable as their use becomes more
widespread. The source of this added value is typically related to the
product's technical compatibility with complementary products (e.g., VCRs
with video tapes, PCs with software). In the case of corporate contract
terms, analogous benefits accrue as a large number of firms adopt the same
contract term.
Contractual network benefits mirror the learning benefits described
above, but they arise in the future-while the firm is operating under a
10. If we were comparing a customized term with an explicit standardized term, as opposed to a
default rule, precedents holding that the standard term is valid would be the analogous benefit Validity
is obviously not an issue in the case of a default rule.
I1. The choice of Delaware as a state of incorporation and the choice of New York law to govern
bond indentures are actual examples of corporate contract terms that carry a great many learning
benefits, including judicial precedent, familiarity among lawyers, and familiarity among investors.
12. For a more detailed description of network benefits in the corporate law context, see Klausner,
supra note 2, at 772-75. For an economic analysis of network externalities in the context of network
products see Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product
Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 940 (1986), Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985).
1996]
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particular term. They include higher quality, lower cost legal and other
professional services in the future, as the firm encounters questions or
disputes regarding rights and obligations under a contract term. Network
benefits also include the availability of a large number of investors and
securities analysts who are able to price the firm's securities at later public
offerings and on the secondary market. 3 Finally, they include judicial
interpretations that courts issue during the period in which the term is in
use. These interpretations reduce uncertainty that might arise regarding the
term's applicability as the business environment changes over time.
Although network benefits accrue in the future-after the firm has
adopted a contract term-their present value adds to the value of the term
at the time of adoption. The value of network benefits depends on the
number of firms that are expected to use a given term in the future.
Like learning benefits, network benefits are externalities from one user
to another. But whereas learning externalities run in only one direction,
from earlier to later users, network externalities run in two directions, in
that all users benefit from each other's use regardless of when they started
using the term.'4
The presence of learning and network benefits raises the question of
whether market forces can be expected to produce a socially optimal degree
of standardization. As we have shown elsewhere, there is no reason to
expect that they will. Learning and network externalities create coordina-
tion, cross-subsidy, and information cascade problems that market forces
cannot be counted on to solve.' If learning or network externalities are
significant in a particular type of contract term, firms may employ
suboptimal terms. Such suboptimality can arise in any of three ways. First,
a term that was optimal when it originated may have become obsolete as
a result of changes in the business environment and yet remain standard.
Within some threshold of adequacy, the existing term may act as a barrier
to improvement. Second, it is possible for a suboptimal term to become
standardized from the start and remain so. Third, a term may become
13. There is an overlap in learning and network benefits in that common use in the not-too-distant
past may be sufficient for purposes of familiarity. Unless the term continues to be widely used,
however, familiarity among investors and analysts will fade, and liquidity and pricing accuracy will
decline.
14. The present value of network benefits may be lower for early adopters than for later adopters.
15. In particular situations, institutions may arise that respond to these problems. Law firms and
investment banks may do so, for example. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2, at 36-43 (finding that
investment banks perform limited coordination but that law firms do not). Law reform organizations,
legal form publishers, and continuing legal education organizations may do so as well.
[V.OL. 74:347
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss2/3
PATH DEPENDENCE IN CORPORATE CONTRACTING
standardized and widely used even if it would be optimal for some firms
to adopt an alternative term. This would be a case of suboptimal uniformi-
ty .1
6
II. AGENCY COSTS AND HERD BEHAVIOR IN DRAFTING
CORPORATE CONTRACTS
The analysis of learning and network externalities assumes that the
decision to adopt a contract term is based on the value of the term to the
adopting firm. One might imagine for purposes of that analysis that loyal
managers of the firm are directly involved in drafting the corporate
contract. In reality, however, lawyers and other professionals design and
draft contract terms." Although they presumably attempt to draft contracts
that promote the interest of their clients, the interests of the draftsman may
diverge from those of the client firm."8 This divergence of interest may
create a bias on the part of the draftsman to employ a standard term rather
than customizing an alternative term, even if customization would be best
from the client firm's perspective. The discussion below explores some of
the dynamics that can create such a bias. We make no claim regarding the
prevalence of the bias or its magnitude in particular circumstances. Like our
discussion of increasing returns, our objective is merely to suggest that the
issue warrants further attention.
Although a client pays a lawyer directly for his advice and drafting
services, the lawyer's future income is heavily dependent on the reputation
he builds serving clients. Clients, however, have imperfect information
regarding the quality of a lawyer's draftsmanship at the time a contract is
drafted. In making judgments about the quality of the contract, they must
rely largely on the outcome of the contract-whether it is successful in
accomplishing the client's objectives. Moreover, potential clients have little
16. Klausner, supra note 2, at 798-815. Individual firms will customize terms if doing so is more
attractive to them than adopting the standard term. The third suboptimal scenario is that groups of firms
that should adopt the same non-standard term (that is, a secondary standard term) instead adopt the
primary standard term.
Another form of suboptimal standardization that we discuss elsewhere, but that is not relevant to this
discussion, is the case of excess diversity-too little standardization. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2,
at 21-24, 29-30; Klausner, supra note 2, at 801-04.
17. For simplicity, we will refer to the lawyer as the draftsman of the contract. Although the
analysis might well apply to in-house lawyers, the setting we have in mind is one in which outside
lawyers draft contracts for client firms.
18. For purposes of this discussion, when we refer to the firm's interest we mean that of the firm's
shareholders.
1996]
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if any information about the quality of a contract produced for another
client at the time it is drafted. They, even more than the actual client, see
only the outcome. Consequently, a lawyer's reputation as a draftsman will
be substantially influenced by the success or failure of the contracts he has
drafted.
At the time a lawyer drafts a contract, he will have imperfect foresight
regarding what contingencies will arise, how a court will interpret the
contract if it is contested in court, or whether a court will invalidate it if it
is challenged under some applicable law. All of these matters are subject
to uncertainty. For the reasons cited in the discussion of learning above,
however, one would generally expect a standard contract term to offer less
uncertainty than a customized term; unless there has been a significant
change in the business environment, the variance in possible outcomes will
thus be lower for standard contract terms than for customized terms.
The relative certainty that standard terms offer may lead a lawyer to
employ such a term even if the expected value of the term to his client is
lower than the expected value of a customized term. This attraction to
greater certainty could have several sources. First, and most simply, even
if the reputational payoff to a lawyer is linearly related to the value of a
term to the client, risk aversion on the part of a lawyer would create a bias
in favor of a standard term. To the extent that a lawyer cannot diversify
career risk, lawyers will frequently be more risk averse than their clients.' 9
Depending on the expected value of customizing contract terms in
particular cases, there will be some threshold within which a risk averse
lawyer will rationally choose a standard term rather than a customized term
with a higher expected value for both himself and his client.
In addition, the reputational payoff to the lawyer may not be linearly
related to the value of a contract term to the client. In some settings, a
contract term that fails-for example, by inadequately responding to a
contingency that occurs-may weigh more heavily in a lawyer's
reputational payoff than a contract term that succeeds. The lawyer's payoff
may thus be asymmetrical. When a contract has been drafted to respond to
a particular contingency, success in doing so may be unremarkable. Once
the contingency has occurred, the draftsman may not appear particularly
prescient in foreseeing it. In contrast, a failure to anticipate a contingency
that actually occurs can look especially damning from the harsh perspective
19. In the case of clients that are publicly held corporations, shareholders can be concerned only
with undiversibiable risk.
[VOL. 74:347
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of twenty-twenty hindsight. The same can be true of a contract that a court
misinterprets or invalidates." Under these circumstances, if a standard
term offers a lower variance in potential outcomes for the client than does
a customized term, even a risk neutral lawyer will have a bias in favor of
employing a standard contract term.2
Until now, we have assumed that a standard term offers greater certainty
in outcomes than does a customized term-that is, lower variance in
responsiveness to future contingencies, judicial interpretations, and judicial
rulings on validity. The bias toward standard terms has arisen from either
lawyers' risk aversion or from an asymmetrical relationship between the
lawyer's reputational payoff and the results he achieves for his client. Even
if lawyers are not risk averse and standard contract terms do not offer
greater certainty in outcomes for clients, however, there is yet another,
more subtle dynamic that can lead to a draftsman's bias in favor of
standard terms. The dynamic is that of "herd" behavior, which financial
economists have observed among corporate managers and professional
money managers.' Herd behavior loosely refers to a situation in which
people imitate the actions of others and in so doing ignore, to some extent,
their own information and judgments regarding the merits of their
decisions. One explanation of herd behavior focuses on decisions made by
agents whose interests do not coincide with those of their principals.23 The
concept is loosely reflected in John Maynard Keynes' observation that
"[w]orldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail convention-
20. See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 98-99 (1992) (courts have difficulty evaluating business decisions from ex ante perspective once
bad outcomes occur).
21. Ron Gilson and Bernard Black have similarly speculated that lawyers are judged on the basis
of outcomes. They suggest that lawyers advise acquirors to freeze out minority shareholders following
a tender offer because the potential outcomes of that advice have lower variance than the potential
outcomes of operating an acquired company with minority shareholders. They believe that the mean
outcome of a freezeout, after factoring in the cost, is lower than keeping minority shareholders. See
RONALD GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1249-52
(2d ed. 1995).
22. MICHAEL DERTOUZO ET AL., MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE PRODUCTIVE EDGE 46
(1989) (managers are attached to the old way of doing things); Josef Lakonishok et al., The Impact of
Institutional Trading on Stock Prices, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 23 (1992) (pension managers herd in small stock
selections).
23. Economists have also provided explanations of herd behavior that are not based on agency
costs. These explanations, based on the concept of informational cascades, relate to our discussion of
learning in Part I. See, e.g., Abhijit Banaedjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797
(1992); Sushil Bikchandani et al., A Theory of Feds, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as
Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992).
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ally than to succeed unconventionally."24 Contract standardization may be
a species of herd behavior.
In one model, David Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein show that herd
behavior will occur as a consequence of agents' rational attempts to
enhance their reputations or, in their terms, "to manipulate the labor
market's inferences regarding their ability."'  This occurs in a setting
where the outcomes of agents' decisions (investment decisions in their
model) are uncertain and where there is some correlation in the errors (the
bad investments) that good agents make.26 Because even a good agent can
take an action that leads to a bad outcome, the market looks at both the
outcome and the actual action taken before forming a judgment regarding
an agent's ability. If a bad outcome occurs but the action was one that
other agents had taken as well, and hence, also suffered bad outcomes as
well, the reputational penalty for the agent is not as great as if the agent
was alone in taking the action. The result of the model is a "sharing-the-
blame" effect in which agents rationally follow one another's actions, even
if they believe that the expected value of deviating from the herd is greater
than that of following the herd.
The setting specified for this model of herd behavior seems to fit many
contracting situations. Although a contract term, like an investment, is
intended to yield a positive outcome, it entails risk. As discussed above, a
lawyer will be judged in part on the outcome that occurs. In many
situations, however, judgments regarding the lawyer's ability will be less
harsh if the contract term that led to the bad outcome was one that many
other lawyers had employed in similar circumstances. Consistent with
Scharfstein and Stein's result, one senses that a lawyer's reputation suffers
more from the failure of a contract that he has customized himself than
from the failure of a standard contract that he, along with many others,
have used before in similar contexts. The result, as Scharfstein and Stein
show, can be herd behavior that takes the form of adopting a standard
contract term.27
24. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
158 (1936).
25. David Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AMER. ECON. REv. 465,
466 (1990).
26. In the extreme case that they model, all good managers receive a signal that an investment is
a good one, and all bad agents receive random signals. Their result holds, however, so long as there
is some correlation in the prediction errors of good agents. Id. at 468.
27. A difficulty with Scharfstein and Stein's model is that the payoff to succeeding with the herd
is higher than that of succeeding alone. This is because the market adjusts for the possibility that an
[VOL. 74:347
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Jeffrey Zwiebel has shown that herd behavior can also occur in a setting
in which the market observes outcomes and not the actions that led to those
outcomes.28 In Zwiebel's model, agents have a choice of taking one of
two actions, each of which leads to randomly distributed outcomes: the
industry standard; or an innovation with a higher expected value. The
standard action and the innovation are equally risky-that is, the variance
in their potential outcomes is the same.29 All agents can take the standard
action, but only a few can innovate (perhaps because the flash of insight
strikes rarely) in his model. Payoffs to an agent, which take the form of
enhanced reputation and higher pay in the future, depend on the market's
inference of his ability. In addition, agents that perform sufficiently poorly
experience a disproportionately harsh penalty, such as being fired.3"
Zwiebel shows that if only outcomes are observed, the market can best
make inferences about an agent's actual ability by comparing his outcomes
with the those of other agents. Relative performance, rather than absolute
performance, thus determines an agent's reputational payoff. He further
shows that even though the riskiness of the standard action and the
innovation are the same, the riskiness of relative performance is greater for
innovating than for taking the standard action.31 Accordingly, while
innovating is attractive because of is its higher expected value, the standard
action is attractive because relative performance under the standard action
provides a more accurate (less risky) measure of actual ability.
Zwiebel shows that under these conditions, unless the expected value of
innovating is sufficiently large or the reputational cost to failure is
sufficiently small, most agents will take the standard action. In effect,
accurate measurement of their abilities-through inferences based on
relative performance-will outweigh the effect of a higher likelihood of
absolute success. Only agents that have very good or very bad reputations
at the start will innovate-the former because they are relatively unlikely
agent that succeeds alone was lucky rather than talented. See Jeffrey Zwiebel, Corporate Conservatism,
Herd Behavior and Relative Compensation, 103 J. POL. EcON. 1, 15 (1995). It is unclear whether this
element of their payoff structure commonly fits contraction situations.
28. Id. Zwiebel shows that his results also obtain if both actions and outcomes are observed. Id.
at II.
29. The innovation thus stochastically dominates the standard action.
30. Zwiebel models this as a discontinuity in payoffs. See id. at 5-6.
31. To illustrate the distinction between risk in absolute performance and risk in relative
performance, Zwiebel notes that if a fund manager took money out of the stock market prior to the
1987 crash, he would have reduced the absolute risk of his fund's performance, but he would have
increased the risk of its performance relative to other funds. Id. at 2.
1996]
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to suffer from a bad outcome, and the latter because they will benefit from
inaccurate evaluation.32
Although contracting settings vary widely, it seems reasonable to expect
that a significant number of them will conform to the setting specified in
Zwiebel's model. Clients and potential clients may well observe only
outcomes, as assumed in his model (or outcomes may dominate the
lawyer's reputational payoff so much that the ex post observation of a
contract term employed has no significant effect). In addition, once a
standard contract term exists, customization is by definition infrequent, as
required by his model. Finally, there are several reasons to expect that the
lawyer's penalty for a bad outcome will often be disproportionately severe
in comparison to his reward for a good outcome. First, if a contract leads
to bad results for a client, the client may fire the lawyer, other clients may
learn of the outcome and fire him as well, and potential clients will not hire
him.33 At the extreme, sufficiently poor performance can also result in a
malpractice suit, which can entail not only liability but a devastating
reputational impact to boot. Second, as we speculate above, when outcomes
are observed, a success may weigh less heavily in the lawyer's reputational
payoff than a failure. Like a reputation for ethical behavior, a reputation as
a contract lawyer may have to be built on many successful contracts, while
it may be ruined with only one failure. Third, even if the reputational
payoff to the lawyer is linear with respect to his relative performance, risk
aversion would create a disproportionality in payoffs measured in utility.
Consequently, consistent with Zwiebel's model, we should expect most
lawyers to be attracted to standard contract terms when the value of
customizing is not substantially greater than the value of the standard term.
Lawyers with more secure reputations and those with a high level of
confidence that they can customize a much better contract will do so-as
will low-quality lawyers that want to roll the dice on a good outcome.
In sum, although the precise dynamic may vary according to context,
there are several reasons to suspect that the involvement of lawyers in the
contract drafting process can lead to the persistence of standard contract
terms that are not value-maximizing for the client.
32. The likelihood of innovating increases in Zwiebel's model as the mean outcome of innovating
increases relative to the mean outcome of taking the standard action. It also increases as the number
of agents with the option of adopting the innovation increases.
33. This is directly analogous to Zwiebel's assumption that a manager will be fired, and thereby
incur disproportionate losses, if he performs poorly. Id. at 5-6.
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III. COGNITIVE BIAS AND STANDARDIZATION
Research in behavioral psychology has documented several phenomena
that may lead to a reluctance to diverge from standard contractual terms.
In this Part, we discuss the findings in the behavioral psychology literature
and examine the relevance of these findings for the persistence of standard
contract terms. In particular, we address three behavioral biases: status quo
bias; anchoring bias; and conformity bias.
A. Status Quo Bias
"Status quo bias" refers to a psychological preference for the present
state and corresponding bias against either "buying" an object that the
person does not "own" or "selling" an object that a person does "own.34
Closely related to status quo bias is the "endowment effect"--the fact that
a person will demand more to sell an object that she owns than she would
be willing to pay for the same object if she did not own it."
The existence of status quo bias and the endowment effect has been
documented in various laboratory experiments. For example, in one study
by Knetsch and Sinden,36 some participants were initially given three
dollars in cash and others were given a lottery ticket (the prize was a
choice between a $70 bookstore voucher or $50 in cash). After this initial
"endowment," each participant was offered the chance to exchange the cash
for the ticket or, the ticket for the cash. Of the thirty-eight participants who
received the ticket, thirty-one (82%) kept it and seven (18%) exchanged it
for cash. Of the thirty-nine participants who received cash, fifteen (38%)
exchanged it for the ticket and twenty-four (62%) kept the cash.
According to conventional economic reasoning, whether a participant
initially received cash or a ticket should not be a relevant factor in
determining whether the participant prefers cash or a ticket. Assume, for
example, that individual preferences are distributed such that 60% of the
34. William F. Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
35. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (discussing and reporting tests of endowment effect).
36. See Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded:
Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507, 512-13
(1984). For other studies of the endowment effect, see Kahneman et al., supra note 35; Jack L. Knetsch,
The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 1277
(1989).
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participants prefer the cash and 40% of the participants prefer the lottery
ticket. As the initial recipients of cash and lottery tickets are randomly
selected, one would expect that, when given the exchange opportunity, 40%
of the cash recipients would exchange their cash for lottery tickets and 60%
of the ticket recipients would trade their tickets for cash-i.e., that half of
the participants would accept the exchange opportunity. Indeed, convention-
al economic reasoning would predict that half of the participants would
accept the exchange opportunity whatever the preference distribution
between cash and lottery tickets and that the ultimate proportion of
ticketholders and cashholders would be equal in both the group that initially
received the ticket and the group that initially received the cash.
In the experimental setting described above, however, only 28% of the
participants accepted the opportunity to exchange, and the ultimate
proportion of ticketholders was 82% in the group of initial ticket recipients
but only 38% in the group of initial cash recipients. These percentages, the
authors posit, is attributable to the endowment effect.37 Participants value
their initial endowment more highly than they would otherwise. Therefore,
fewer than half of the participants will engage in a trade.
In another laboratory experiment, Samuelson and Zeckhauser asked
participants how they would invest a large amount of money that they had
recently inherited." Some participants were told that they inherited cash
and that they had to choose between different investment options (e.g.,
stock of moderate risk companies, stock of high risk companies, treasury
bills, or municipal bonds). Others were told that the money was presently
invested in one form (e.g., in stock of a moderate risk company) and that
they had to determine whether to change the investment (with insignificant
tax and brokerage costs). Samuelson and Zeckhauser found that participants
elected any one investment option significantly more often when it was
presented as the status quo than when it was presented in a neutral setting
or when a different option was presented as the status quo. The preference
for the status quo increased with the number of alternative options that
were presented.
Laboratory experiments involve controlled, though artificial, conditions
for behavioral studies. The presence of status quo bias, however, is also
supported by more realistic (if less controlled) field studies. Hartman,
Doane, and Woo surveyed California electric power consumers about their
37. Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 36, at 516.
38. See Samuleson & Zeckhauser, supra note 34.
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preferences regarding service reliability and rates.39 One group of survey
participants lived in an area with reliable service and fairly high rates while
another group lived in an area with less reliable services offered at thirty
percent lower rates. The two groups did not differ significantly in income
or electricity consumption. Each participant was offered six service/rate
combinations (including the combination presently provided to her group
as well as the combination provided to the other group). The study revealed
that about 60% of the participants in each group elected to maintain the
respective status quo, while only about 6% opted for the status quo of the
other group.
To be sure, neither the laboratory nor the field study experiments can
conclusively establish the presence of status quo bias. In fact, it would be
hard to design a study that could. Perhaps the artificial setting of laboratory
experiments or the small amount of money at stake40 induces participants
to act differently from the way they would act in the real world. Or,
perhaps the real world phenomena attributed to status quo bias are due to
factors that are difficult to control for statistically. Nonetheless, at this
point, evidence of the existence of status quo bias cannot be dismissed out
of hand, although its significance requires further study.
To the extent that status quo bias exists, it has important implications for
the presence of path dependencies. Status quo bias implies a reluctance to
depart from a status quo. Looking forward, this means that a status quo will
tend to perpetuate itself. Looking backwards, this means that the present
status quo will, to some extent, have been determined by an earlier status
quo.
A more ambiguous issue is whether and how status quo bias relates to
the use of standard corporate contract terms. This issue relates to the way
in which the existing standard terms are perceived by parties about to adopt
a corporate contract. We conjecture that such parties view the standard
terms as the status quo. Although these parties have no formal property (or
other) rights in a standard term, the standard terms form an expectational
baseline similar to the service/rate combination in the Hartman study and
the present investment in the Samuelson and Zeckhauser study. If this is
39. See Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J. ECON.
141 (1991). For other field studies, see Samuelson & Zechkhauser, supra note 34, at 26-33 (reporting
field study evidence for status quo bias in selection of health care plans and retirement plan investment
options).
40. But see Kahneman et al., supra note 35, at 1338-39 (presenting evidence that reluctance to
trade is not due to small stakes).
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true, parties will be reluctant to "trade" standard terms for non-standard
terms. That is, the terms of a new corporate contract will more closely
resemble the standard terms than if the newly formed contract were drafted
on a clean, "neutral" slate. This effect would be present even when the
transaction costs of writing a new contract are minimal.
B. Anchoring Bias
"Anchoring" refers to the ability of initial "reference points" to influence
judgments. Once initial reference points, or "anchors," are established,
adjustments to these initial anchors tend to be too small. Anchoring thus
biases final judgments in the direction of the anchor.
The effects of anchoring are dramatically illustrated in a study by
Pious.4' Plous asked more than 2,000 students to estimate the likelihood
of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. This
question was presented in three different formats. First, some participants
were initially asked to assess whether that likelihood was greater or less
than one percent (i.e., members of the group were exposed to a low
anchor). A second group was initially asked whether that likelihood was
greater or less than ninety percent (i.e., members of the group were exposed
to a high anchor). A third group was asked to estimate the likelihood of a
nuclear war without any preceding question (i.e., without exposing the
members to an anchor). The results show the effect of anchoring. Of the
approximately 1,500 students who responded to the survey, participants
who were not exposed to an anchor assessed the probability of a nuclear
war at 19.1%. Participants who were exposed to the low anchor assessed
the probability at 10.8%. Participants who were exposed to the high anchor
assessed the probability at 25.7%. That is, the participants' responses varied
with their initial reference points.
A similar study illustrates the effect of anchoring on economic judg-
ments. Northcraft and Neale42 asked two groups of participants-students
and actual real estate agents-to assess the fair price of a house. Partici-
pants were first quoted an "asking price," which was either substantially
below, slightly below, slightly above, or substantially above the actual
asking price for the house. The participants were permitted to visit and
41. See S. Pious, Thinking the Unthinkable: The Effects ofAnchoring on Likelihood Estimates of
Nuclear War, 19 3. App. Soc. PSYCH. 67 (1989).
42. See Gregory B. Northeraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An
Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORO. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 84 (1987).
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inspect the house before determining its fair value. The results showed that
the higher the anchor-the quoted asking price-the higher the fair value
estimated by the participants. For example, students that were quoted
$119,900 as the asking price (a figure substantially below the actual asking
price of $134,900) assessed the house's fair value on average at approxi-
mately $117,000, while students quoted $149,900 as the asking price
assessed the fair value at approximately $144,000. The same pattern was
present, although somewhat less strikingly, for the actual real estate agents.
Their assessed fair price increased from approximately $114,000 when
exposed to the low anchor to approximately $129,000 when exposed to the
high one.43
Standard contract terms may have an anchoring effect analogous to those
observed in the experiments described above. Standard terms carry an aura
of stability and objectivity even more than the anchors used in these
studies. Although the presence of learning and network externalities may
provide a rational reason for a firm to adopt a standard term, the possibility
of anchoring bias suggests that a decision to adopt such a term may not be
wholly rational or value-enhancing.
C. Conformity Bias
A third behavioral trait that may contribute to contractual path depen-
dence is conformity bias. The classic study on conformity bias was
performed by Asch." Asch asked participants to match the length of a
"standard" line with one of three comparison lines. Each participant was
placed in a group of six to eight people, with the other group members
acting on the instructions of the experimenter, unbeknownst to the
participant. The other group members had been instructed in some runs to
offer an answer that was clearly wrong, and to do so before the participant
presented her own answer. The participant thus faced the dilemma of either
conforming to the judgment of the other group members or sticking to her
own judgment. Asch found that 74% of the participants gave an incorrect
answer in at least some of the twelve runs where they were confronted with
the false group answers, and 28% of the participants offered an incorrect
answer in more than half of the twelve runs. In contrast, in a control study,
only 5% of the participants made any error in comparing the line lengths.
43. Northeraft & Neale, supra note 42, at 84 (Table 3).
44. Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgements, in GRoups, LEADERSHIP AND MEN (H. Guetzkow ed., 1951).
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Results similar to those reported by Asch have also been obtained in
other experimental settings. These studies have identified a number of
factors that affect the willingness of participants to conform to group
judgments. From the perspective of this article, the following factors are
particularly significant. First, conformity is much greater on difficult items
than easy ones.45 Second, conformity is greater if the group is cohesive
or consists of peers whom the subject regards as competent than if it
consists of strangers.46 Third, conformity is greater if the subject must
state her opinion openly, rather than privately.47 And fourth, there are
substantial individual differences in the degree of conformity, with less
intelligent subjects or subjects with low ego and feelings of personal
inadequacy exhibiting more conformity than more intelligent subjects or
subjects with high ego and no feelings of inadequacy.48
Whether conformity bias leads to standardization of contract terms is
difficult to resolve. It is certainly plausible that parties about to enter into
a contract view the standard form as a group judgment. Moreover, the
relevant group generally is one consisting of peers-usually other lawyers
working in the same area-who are respected and whose respect one tries
to gain. The issues with respect to which one may consider deviating from
the standard terms tend to be complex and involve judgment calls-all
factors that would strengthen conformity bias. On the other hand, lawyers
who want to deviate from the standard terms express their views in a
substantially less public manner than, say, the participants in the Asch
study. And, at least in popular perception, the average lawyer does not
suffer from a low ego or feelings of inadequacy.
We therefore believe that, based on the present evidence in behavioral
psychology, the possibility that conformity bias contributes to standardiza-
tion of contract terms is ambiguous. Nonetheless, the issue warrants
consideration and further study.
45. DAVID KRECH ET AL., INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: A TExTBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 509
(1962).
46. Id. at 514. See also Christian S. Crandall, Social Contagion of Binge Eating, 55 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 588, 595 (1988) (finding that as cohesiveness increased, friends in two
sororities became more similar in their tendencies to engage in binge eating).
47. Solomon E. Asch, An Experimental Investigation of Group Influence, in WALTER REED ARMY
INST. OF RS. & NAT'L REs. COUNCIL, SYMPOSIUM ON PREVENTIVE AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 17,23
(1957).
48. KRECH ETr AL., supra note 45, at 526.
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D. Interaction Among Influences on Standardization
The results of the studies of cognitive bias are subject to different
interpretations, some of which have bearing on our discussion in Part I. In
particular, it is difficult to untangle the influence of anchoring and
conformity bias from that of actual learning.49 In the study of real estate
pricing, for example, the asking bids may have provided actual information
to the participants. Especially for the students, who presumably had little
experience in valuing real estate, the asking bid may have been perceived
as useful information regarding the actual value of a house. On the other
hand, in the experiment involving nuclear war, it is unlikely that the
reference points would have been viewed as providing information
regarding the actual probabilities, and the results seem more likely to reflect
pure cognitive bias.
Moreover, standardization may be the product of cognitive biases
operating in conjunction with the other dynamics discussed in this article.
To the extent that lawyers draft contracts, cognitive biases may be present
along with more rational judgments regarding the reputational payoff to
employing a standard term or customizing a new one. Similarly, cognitive
biases may be present along with learning and network benefits. For
example, the judgments of lawyers and their clients regarding whether a
term will be widely used in the future (and hence accrue network benefits)
may be influenced by expectations regarding the operation of cognitive
biases on other firm managers and lawyers.
As a general matter, it is not necessary to specify the relative importance
of the various influences on standardization. At this point, our aim is
simply to identify influences that can lead to excessive standardiza-
tion-and thus to path dependence in corporate contracting.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has briefly explored several phenomena that may lead to
excessive standardization in corporate contract terms. Although a standard
term may well be socially optimal, each of the influences that we have
explored creates the possibility that a corporate contract term will become
49. See, e.g., Sushil Bikehandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change
as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 1013 (1992) (discussing information-based
interpretation of results of conformity bias); Robert Shiller, Conversation, Information, and Herd
Behavior, 85 AmER. EcON. REv. 181, 182 (1995) (same).
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widely adopted even though an alternative term would be superior from a
societal perspective. Even if individual firms behave in a value-maximizing
manner, learning-related informational cascades and network externalities
can lead to standardization that fails to maximize the aggregate value of all
firms. Moreover, when the role of the lawyer as drafting agent is intro-
duced, agency costs and herd behavior among lawyers add to the attractive
force of standard terms and introduce the possibility that a firm will adopt
a term that fails to maximize its value. Finally, moving outside the realm
of rational choice, cognitive biases can further enhance the attraction of
standard terms over superior customized terms and lead to the adoption of
standard terms that do not maximize a firm's value.
At this point, we make no claim regarding the extent of these influences.
Nor do we make any claim regarding whether some form of legal
intervention might improve corporate contracts.5 Our only claim is that
a better understanding of these forces, particularly regarding their
importance as an empirical matter, would enhance both our understanding
of the contractual nature of the corporation and our ability to evaluate
particular contract terms that develop.
A better understanding of these forces might also sharpen our insights
into corporate governance systems in other countries. Differences across
countries in the structure and organization of the corporation are commonly
the product of legislation, but they may also be the product of private
arrangements that can at least loosely be viewed as contracts. To the extent
that firms in different countries have "standardized" around different
contract terms or analogous institutions, two explanations are plausible:
First, contract terms and institutions may be optimally adapted to the
economic environment of each country, with differences across systems
reflecting environmental differences; but second, contract terms and
institutions may to some extent reflect the forces discussed in this article.
One cannot develop an understanding built around the first, more
conventional, explanation without investigating whether the second
explanation is pertinent as well.
50. One of us has suggested that a corporate law regime built more around menus of alternative
terms than default rules would be warranted if network externalities are significant. Klausner, supra note
2, at 337-41.
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